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Liberals and Libertines: The Marriage 
Question in the Liberal Political 
Imagination 
NOMI MAYA STOLZENBERG* 
Two novellas neatly frame the discussion of “the marriage question” 
in liberal political thought: Leo Tolstoy’s study of marital jealousy and 
femmicide, The Kreutzer Sonata,1 published in 1889, and Philip Roth’s 
confession of a latter-day libertine, The Dying Animal2—another work 
obsessed with male jealousy and death, which appeared in 2001.  In fact, 
both of these novellas assume the form of a confession of a lapsed 
libertine.  The Kreutzer Sonata is presented in the classic style of the tale 
told to a stranger on a train, and The Dying Animal also is styled as a 
dialogue with an unknown interlocutor.  In both novellas, the lapsed 
libertine who addresses his remarks to “you” is actually a self-absorbed 
monologist, given to sweeping diagnoses of society’s ills, in practice if 
not by actual trade a kind of political theoretician, obsessed with 
analyzing the social and psychological causes of his own downfall, and 
compulsively unburdening himself to a nameless, faceless confessor. 
The heart of the libertine’s lament in each case is a diatribe against the 
institution of marriage. 
Equally consumed with escaping the “snare” of sex and pursuing an 
impossibly pure and elusive ideal of personal freedom, Tolstoy’s and 
Roth’s lapsed libertines skewer marriage and along with that, what 
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California School of Law.
1. Leo Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata, in THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER
STORIES (Signet Classic 2003) (1886).
2. PHILIP ROTH, THE DYING ANIMAL (2001).
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passes for liberal thinking in their day: equality for women, marrying for 
love, an end to sexual repression (little seems to have changed since the 
late nineteenth century).  In doing so, they submit both liberalism and 
marriage to a joint interrogation that reveals a deep connection between 
the two, as well as deep strains of ambivalence that exist within liberal 
thought with regard to freedom in the domain of love, sex, and personal 
attachments. 
Most of this essay is devoted to identifying the strains of ambivalence 
in liberalism revealed in the libertine’s diatribe against marriage.  Liberalism 
has always been at pains to differentiate itself from libertinism—“liberty, 
not license,” and “liberalism, not libertinism” have been common refrains.  
However, one of the claims of this essay is that libertinism and liberalism 
are more like kissing cousins, or, even better, twins separated at birth 
(libertinism being the designated “evil one”).  Recognizing this secret 
kinship can help us understand how “the marriage question” has been 
framed and why it has persisted in the modern liberal political tradition. 
The liberal political cause of advancing individual freedom has always 
had a vexed relationship to the realm of the irrational and the appetites.  
Freedom of the will is one thing; freedom of desire, or free love, quite 
another.  The difficulties of adapting traditional “virtue-based” liberalism to 
a world which gives the appetites and desire free reign have been evident 
not only in the debates about marriage and intimate relationships, but 
also in the context of the economy and market relationships where the 
sovereignty of the consumer and her subjective preferences pose many 
of the same challenges to traditional liberalism as do the sexual desires 
of the libertine. 
Love and desire (the relationship between the two is itself a subject of 
controversy) both put strains on the conceptual apparatus of traditional 
liberal thought, which developed at a time when a normative psychology 
subordinating the appetites to reason and virtue was deeply entrenched 
and widely taken for granted.  As a result, it has always been tempting to 
deal with assertions of personal freedom in the realm of desire by simply 
expelling them from the ambit of normative liberalism and attributing 
them to renegade philosophies instead.  Social philosophies that affirm 
the principle of freedom in the domain of love and desire have been 
relegated to any number of precincts outside the parameters of liberal 
thought.  To the left of liberalism is where we supposedly find “libertinism,” 
“radical individualism,” “romanticism,” and the free-love “anarchism” 
cultivated by the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century 
“sex radicals,” and taken up again in the sixties sexual revolution, and 
the post-Stonewall seventies.  To the right of liberalism we supposedly 
encounter Christian anarchism and the theology of Christian love that 
Tolstoy embraced, along with other varieties of “conservative” thought 
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exalting the bonds of love and loyalty constitutive of family, community, 
nation, and elevating faith over reason. 
Interestingly (though unsurprisingly if the economic determinists have 
things even halfway right), in the realm of market relations, the impulse 
to cast the valorization of subjective desires as a nonliberal, radical, or 
conservative ideal—that is, to cast it out of liberal theory—has for the 
most part been successfully resisted.  (Liberals may debate the merits of 
laissez-faire economics, but no one denies the fundamental link between 
free-market libertarianism and the political philosophy of classical 
liberalism.)  By contrast, in the context of romantic relationships, the 
philosophical kinship between the regulators and the antiregulators is 
frequently denied. 
However, the critique of marriage is not so easily divorced from 
antilibertine liberal ideals, a difficulty exhibited in the Tolstoy and Roth 
novellas.  One of the things that this pair of novellas serves to remind us 
of is the fact that historically critiques of marriage were voiced both by 
libertines—those who repudiate the institution of sexual monogamy and 
the regulation of sex and sexual morality—and by those most 
strenuously opposed to libertinism.3  Roth’s Kepesh is a pro-sex, 
3. On the definition of libertinism, see THE LIBERTINE READER: EROTICISM AND
ENLIGHTENMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (Michel Feher ed., 1997).  As Feher 
explains in his introduction: 
    Libertinism, as developed in this reader, refers first and foremost to the 
licentious ways of the declining French aristocracy.  However, before the 
eighteenth century, the word “libertine” did not refer exclusively to sexual 
morés.  The term appeared as early as the middle of the sixteenth century 
within a theological context: Calvin used it to denounce a sect of dissident 
Anabaptists whom he accused of abusing their freedom by “transforming 
Scripture into allegory.”  Others used it more generally as synonym for an 
“atheist.”  By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the words “libertine” 
and “libertinism” became associated with an actual school of thought.  The 
“scholarly libertines” (les libertins érudits), an assortment of scholars, poets, 
and dilettantes, formed a small group of freethinkers who shared an aversion to 
dogma; seeking to demystify superstition and to dismantle baseless belief and 
preconceived ideas, they contested both political and religious authority. 
Every watchword imposed by the powers that be, or accepted without question 
by the public, inevitably raised the libertines’ hackles.  Conversely, any thinker 
persecuted for his opinions was counted, by definition, as a member of their 
circle. 
    The first “libertines” were not concerned with substituting any new truths 
for old certainties.  Following Montaigne, whom they held up as a guide, they 
mistrusted anything that appeared to be immutable.  They believed in a 
generalized inconstancy, inherent both in the nature of things and in the heart 
of man.  The freedom of the libertine, then, consists in espousing this universal 
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down-with-love “professor of desire,” who harkens back to the 
eighteenth-century libertines in his refusal of love and marriage for 
the sake of enlivening and prolonging sex.  Like the French 
“philosophical” libertines, such as Laclos and de Sade, he despises 
marriage not only because he thinks it deadens sexual desire but also 
because it subjects the individual to constraints.  Conversely, he 
champions sexual promiscuity in the name of a radical individual 
freedom.  By contrast, Tolstoy’s Pozdnyshev draws an entirely different 
set of equations.  For him, marriage is to be reviled not because it 
dampens or deadens sex, but for just the opposite reason—marriage to 
him is nothing but licensed sex.  For Pozdnyshev, the condemnation of 
marriage and the condemnation of sex go hand in hand.  He criticizes 
marriage as a system of licensed prostitution, as a “trap” that enslaves 
men to women, and women to men.  What he champions is not free love 
as the libertine imagines it, but rather, a much more exalted and 
fundamentally religious (Christian) ideal of love between men and 
women, and of personal freedom—an ideal of true love, true liberty, and 
truly free love which transcends the baser animal appetites and rests, at 
bottom, on the agapeic love of God. 
Yet for all the apparent differences between these two lines of 
argument, what is interesting to note for our purposes is that both the 
libertine’s and the antilibertine’s antimarriage polemics reveal a hidden 
connection between philosophical libertinism and the political philosophy 
of liberalism.  Vis-à-vis conventional liberalism, the libertine and the 
antilibertine, ventriloquized by Roth and Tolstoy respectively, appear 
rather like a pair of disappointed rivals, two jilted lovers each disclosing 
an abiding attachment to the liberalism they purport to scorn—and to 
each other.  Understanding these points of contact between liberal, 
libertine, and antilibertine ideas can help us to better understand 
marriage as it stands in relationship to liberal ideals of equality and 
individual freedom, and liberalism itself. 
What follows then is not one, but two different readings of this pair of 
novellas.  The first reading emphasizes the philosophical boundary lines 
that are conventionally taken to separate liberal from libertine, and libertine 
from antilibertine, thought.  In the second reading, these boundary lines 
collapse, and the points of overlap and ambivalence among these 
inconstancy: he presents himself as emancipated and, as such, scornfully 
rejects the prejudices that aim to pin him down, whether in regard to an idea, a 
god, or a lover. 
Id. at 11–12.  For more on the libertins érudits, see RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF
SKEPTICISM: FROM SAVONAROLA TO BAYLE, 80–99 (rev. and expanded ed. 2003).  For 
more on the links between libertinism and atheism, see ALAN CHARLES KORS, ATHEISM 
IN FRANCE, 1650–1729, 21–30 (1990). 
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philosophical stances toward liberty and love, sex and marriage are 
revealed.  In effect, what I am proposing is that we read the antimarriage 
polemics of Roth and Tolstoy’s lapsed libertines as part of the 
intellectual tradition of liberal thought, albeit a part that is commonly 
disowned.  Reading the novellas in this way is like reading a message 
scrawled in invisible ink on the margins of canonical liberal texts; the 
message is there but usually hidden from sight. 
One last remark: It may seem strange to uphold these two novellas as 
exemplars of liberal political theory.  Not only is there an issue of 
genre—these are literary works, not works of political theory in any 
customary sense—but there is also an issue of content and philosophical 
perspective.  In each novella, the protagonist explicitly advocates a 
particular philosophy of social and sexual relations that is centered on an 
ideal of personal freedom (this helps to answer the genre question).  But 
in neither case is it obvious that the ideal of freedom and political 
philosophy espoused is a liberal one.  In fact, as suggested above, many 
readers will think it more correct to classify the positions espoused in 
each book as antiliberal philosophies—in Tolstoy’s case, as a conservative 
philosophy rooted in the religious doctrines of Russian Orthodoxy and 
firmly opposed to the liberal and libertine doctrines of the day, and in 
Roth’s case, as an avowedly libertine philosophy taking aim at the 
pieties of “political correctness” which, in the view of Roth’s narrator, 
have hijacked liberalism and the sexual revolution of the sixties. 
Despite these issues of substance and style, I want to suggest that it 
may nonetheless be illuminating to read these two novellas as exemplary 
liberal texts about marriage.  Indeed, I will go so far as to venture that 
they should be read as canonical works side by side with Milton’s 
Areopagitica4 and Mill’s On Liberty5 in the canon of the liberal political 
tradition.  It is perhaps no accident that our preeminent theorists of free 
speech also formulated some of the earliest and greatest paeans to what a 
later age would style as free love.  Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce,6 which remains one of the most powerful and moving 
testimonies to the right to divorce, argued well ahead of its time for a 
4. John Milton, Areopagitica, in JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR
PROSE 698 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957). 
5. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL:
ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961) (1863). 
6. John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, in JOHN MILTON,
COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE  (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957). 
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right to be released from the vows of marriage on no grounds other than 
what Milton understood to be the distressingly common plight of a 
marriage that fails to deliver the solaces of physical love and emotional 
affection.  And Mill’s feminist classic, The Subjection of Women,7 a 
broad analysis of “the woman question,” likewise featured a radical 
critique of the traditional structure of marriage.  And if, as I am 
suggesting, there is a hidden connection between the ideas about free 
speech and the ideas about free love in the work of these two great 
theorists, perhaps there is also a link between their political theoretical 
works and their literary artistry that has yet to be identified and 
explained. 
Milton is the most obvious example we have of a great literary 
writer who is at the same time a serious theorist of political and social 
relations.  Mill—who submerged his romantic ideas in the 
hyperrationalist framework of utilitarian thought, and, with the 
important exception of his Autobiography,8 stuck to the genre of 
political theory—is a less obvious case.  But both as a literary stylist 
and as the nineteenth-century thinker who played the leading role in 
integrating romanticism into Anglo-American philosophy, Mill too 
deserves to be placed in the canon of great literary as well as great 
philosophical writers (as my colleague in the English department will 
tell you).9  From this point of view, Tolstoy and Roth can be seen as 
representing just the opposite case: Great fiction writers who deserve 
to be regarded as political theorists as well.  What, then, is the political 
theory expressed in their respective novellas?  An answer is provided 
in our double-read. 
I. FIRST READ: LIBERTINISM VS. LIBERALISM VS MARRIAGE
The first reading of The Dying Animal and The Kreutzer Sonata that I 
want to offer emphasizes their differences.  In this reading, antithetical 
relationships abound.  Libertines oppose marriage.  Antilibertines oppose 
marriage and libertinism.  Libertinism and antilibertinism naturally 
oppose each other.  And both the libertine and the antilibertine oppose 
liberalism, or what passes as the forward liberal thinking of the day. 
7. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Susan Moller Okin ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1988) (1869). 
8. JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Penguin Books 1989)(1873).
9. I would be remiss if I did not express my indebtedness to my colleague in the
USC English Department, Hilary Schor, whose ongoing collaboration on the ideas 
explored in this paper is impossible to separate from this particular essay, as well as to 
Martha Umphrey, who first called my attention to the parallel story lines in The Kreutzer 
Sonata and The Dying Animal, and to Chris Lim, whose intellectual input went well 
beyond the ordinary provision of research assistance.  The usual disclaimers apply. 
STOLZENBERG.DOC 10/5/2005 11:14 AM 
[VOL. 42:  949, 2005] Liberals and Libertines
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
955 
Ironically, while liberalism presents itself as bold, forward-looking, 
sophisticated, progressive, avant-garde—even as slightly outré—it is 
lampooned in both Roth’s and Tolstoy’s novellas as an already stale 
orthodoxy, a silly and shallow set of platitudes about freedom and 
equality, especially between women and men, updating and ornamenting 
a still essentially conservative conventional wisdom. 
Tolstoy sends up liberal sentiments in a comic set piece that precedes 
and frames his lapsed libertine’s confession.  Five passengers are sharing 
a carriage on a train with our narrator, including the antihero 
Pozdnyshev, a clerk, a lady, an old man, and a lawyer.  “The lawyer was 
saying that public opinion in Europe was occupied with the question of 
divorce. . .”10  The predictable exchange ensues, the lady opining that 
people should marry for love (“‘It’s only animals, you know, that can be 
paired off as their master likes; but human beings have their own 
inclinations and attachments’”), the old man retorting that “‘animals are 
cattle, but human beings have a law given to them,’” and the lady 
responding with “an argument which probably seemed very new to her”: 
“‘Yes, but how is one to live with a man when there is not love?’”11  
Solidifying his role as the representative of “barbarous views of women 
and marriage,”12 the old man asserts that “‘the first thing that should be 
required of a woman is fear,’”13 and attributes the changes afoot to the 
sorry fact that people, including women, “‘have got so very educated.’”14  
Rising to the bait, the lady and the lawyer rush to defend “first women’s 
rights, then civil marriage, and then divorce.”15  Their joint effort 
culminates in the lady’s passionate defense of the “European” view of 
marriage: “‘marriage without love is not marriage . . . love alone sanctifies 
marriage, and . . . real marriage is only such as is sanctified by love.’”16
Tolstoy plainly has fun taking this apart.  His Pozdnyshev begins with 
a deceptively simple and hesitant question: “‘What kind of love . . . 
love . . . is it that sanctifies marriage?’”17  Within minutes he has torn to 
shreds every one of the highminded sentiments expressed by the lady 
and the lawyer.  To the lady’s response that the answer to his question is 
10. Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 155.
11. Id. at 157.
12. Id. at 159.
13. Id. at 157.
14. Id. at 156.
15. Id. at 159.
16. Id. at 159.
17. Id. at 160.
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“true love,” Pozdnyshev immediately interposes the question, “‘. . .for 
how long?’”18  To the answer “‘for a lifetime,’” Pozdnyshev scoffs that 
“‘you are talking about what is supposed to be, but I am speaking of 
what is.’”19  “What is,” in his estimate, is nothing but animal attraction, 
which is destined to burn out quickly: “‘To love one person for a whole 
lifetime is like saying that one candle will burn a whole life.’”20  As for 
the lady’s insistence on “‘love based on identity of ideals, on spiritual 
affinity’” rather than “‘physical love,’” Pozdnyshev can only literally 
snort, “‘Spiritual affinity!  Identity of ideals!’” and, in a line of ribald 
sarcasm straight out of Roth, “‘in that case, why go to bed together? 
(Excuse my coarseness.)  Or do people go to bed together because of the 
identity of their ideals?’”21
As a matter of fact, Pozdnyshev maintains, “‘people marry regarding 
marriage as nothing but copulation.’”22  But because this fact is papered 
over with the fiction of “true love,” “‘the result is either deception or 
coercion’”: 
When it is deception it is easier to bear.  The husband and wife merely deceive 
people by pretending to be monogamists, while living polygamously.  That is 
bad, but still bearable.  But when, as most frequently happens, the husband and 
wife have undertaken the external duty of living together all their lives, and 
begin to hate each other after a month, and wish to part but still continue to live 
together, it leads to that terrible hell which makes people take to drink, shoot 
themselves, and kill or poison themselves or one another. . . .23
Pozdnyshev, it soon emerges, is one of the latter kind: a man who has 
murdered his wife in a fit of jealousy, and then gotten off on the time-
honored defense of a crime of passion, only to suffer from remorse ever 
after. 
As Pozdnyshev sees it, it was love, marriage, and libertinism—the 
three are virtually indistinguishable for him—that brought things to such 
a disastrous pass.  How “‘love led to what happened to me’”24 and “‘how 
and why I married’”25 are the self-same story, a story of “‘horror,’” the 
“‘root of [which] lies’” in regarding “‘woman as something to be 
desired.’”26  Such a debased and debasing attitude expresses itself in 
debauchery and “dissolute” living.  But “‘dissoluteness does not lie in 
18. Id. at 160.
19. Id. at 161.
20. Id. at 161.
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id. at 162.
23. Id. at 162.  The comparison between Tolstoy and Roth suggested here may be
enhanced by considering another short novel of Roth’s entitled Deception, the story of an 
adulterous affair.  PHILIP ROTH, DECEPTION (1997).   
24. Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 163.
25. Id. at 164.
26. Id. at 165.
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anything physical—no kind of physical misconduct is debauchery,’” 
Pozdnyshev explains to his captive audience.  Rather, “‘real debauchery 
lies precisely in freeing oneself from moral relations with a woman with 
whom you have physical intimacy.’”27  Before his marriage, he lived 
“‘as everybody does, that is everybody in our class . . . that is, 
dissolutely,’” which is to say, “‘I was not a seducer, had no unnatural 
tastes, did not make that the chief purpose of my life as many of my 
associates did, but I practiced debauchery in a steady, decent way for 
health’s sake.’”28  Such behavior, while conventionally frowned upon 
was also tacitly approved: “‘What was really a fall was regarded by some as 
a most legitimate function, good for one’s health, and by others as a very 
natural and not only excusable but even innocent amusement for a young 
man.’”29
And thus a “libertine” was born—a condition that Pozdnyshev regards 
in much the same way that we might today regard alcoholism, that is, as 
a pathology creating a state of dependency, at once physical, social, and 
moral, from which one never fully recovers: 
I had become what is called a libertine.  To be a libertine is a physical condition 
like that of a morphinist, a drunkard, or a smoker.  As a morphinist, a drunkard, 
or a smoker is no longer normal, so too a man who has known several women 
for his pleasure is not normal but is a man perverted forever, a libertine. . . .  A 
libertine may restrain himself, may struggle, but he will never have those pure, 
simple, clear, brotherly relations with a woman.  By the way he looks at a 
woman and examines her, a libertine can always be recognized.  And I had 
become and I remained a libertine, and it was this that brought me to ruin.30
Our man Pozdnyshev, then, is not so much an antilibertine as he is a 
recovering libertine, convinced that sexual feelings have led to his 
downfall, and to the downfall of society at large. 
The twist in Pozdnyshev’s analysis is that he perceives moral 
dissolution and sexual debauchery to exist everywhere, not just in the 
carousing that is winkingly condemned by society, but also in what are 
conventionally taken to be “respectable” relations.  What passes for 
society among the upper classes “‘is simply a brothel’”31 and marriage 
nothing but “‘licensed debauchery.’”32  Although everyone pretends otherwise,  
27. Id. at 164.
28. Id. at 164.
29. Id. at 167.
30. Id. at 167.
31. Id. at 171.
32. Id. at 180.
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“‘what women know very well’” is that “‘the most exalted poetic love, 
as we call it, depends not on moral qualities but on physical nearness and 
on the coiffure, and the colour and cut of the dress. . . .  [T]hat is why,’” 
to Pozdnyshev’s never-ending torment, “‘there are those detestable 
jerseys, bustles, and naked shoulders, arms, almost breasts.’”33
In some of the most brilliantly (perhaps unintentionally) funny passages 
in the book, Tolstoy describes the mating rituals of aristocratic society in 
which “‘marriages are arranged . . . like traps’” and “‘amorous young people 
are forced like cucumbers in a hot-bed’” amid a “‘superabundance of 
food, together with complete physical idleness’”—an atmosphere which 
“‘is nothing but a systematic excitement of desire,’” papered over by the 
romantic liberal fiction of true love.34
In reality that love of mine was the result, on the one hand of her mamma’s and 
the dressmakers’ activity, and on the other of the super-abundance of food 
consumed while living an idle life.  If on the one hand, there had been no 
boating, no dressmaker and so forth, and had my wife been sitting at home in a 
shapeless dressing gown, and I had on the other hand been in circumstances 
normal to man—consuming just enough food to suffice for the work I did, and 
had the safety-valve been open—it happened to be closed at the time—I should 
not have fallen in love and nothing of all this would have happened.35
One recognizes here intimations of the same domestic idyll—the natural 
rhythms of hard work, a simple life, and the “natural love” between a 
man and a woman uncorrupted by society—that characterize the 
relations between Pierre and Natasha at the end of War and Peace36 and, 
in fits and starts, between Kitty and Levin in Anna Karenina.37  
However, such pure love, Pozdnyshev observes mournfully, is given to 
only a few.  “‘Among at least ninety nine percent of the human race,’” 
things are done the old-fashioned way commended by the old man, that 
is, through arranged marriage: “‘Only among one per cent or less, 
among us libertines, has it been discovered that that is not right, and 
something new has been invented.’”38
The lady and the lawyer foolishly imagine that this “something new” 
represents a form of progress, a liberal solution to the marriage question: 
the replacement of the practice of arranged marriages with consensual, 
companionate marriage, based on true love, coupled with the right to 
33. Id. at 170–71.
34. Id. at 171–72.
35. Id. at 172.
36. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE (Rosemary Edmunds trans., 3rd ed. Penguin
Books 1982). 
37. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds.,
Constance Garnett trans., 4th ed. Modern Library 2000).   
38. Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 173.
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divorce if and when love runs out.  In fact, what this modern liberal 
system amounts to is nothing more than libertinism of old: 
“[T]he maidens sit round and the men walk about, as at a bazaar, choosing. 
And the maidens wait and think, but dare not say: ‘Me, please!,’ ‘No, me!,’ 
‘Not her, but me!’, ‘Look what shoulders and other things I have!”  And we 
men stroll around and look, and are very pleased.  ‘Yes, I know!  I won’t be 
caught!’  They stroll about and look, and are very pleased that everything is 
arranged like that for them.  And then in an unguarded moment—snap!  He is 
caught!”39
Tolstoy is at his most penetrating when analyzing the “equality 
question,” that is, the question of equality between women and men that 
was understood to lie at the heart of the marriage question.  What 
Pozdnyshev perceives, that the liberal lady and lawyer do not, is that if 
“‘prearranged matches are degrading, why this is a thousand times 
worse!  Then the rights and chances were equal, but here the woman is a 
slave in a bazaar or the bait in a trap.’”40
What we have here is the standard left critique of liberal markets, 
applied to the marriage market: competition produces inequalities more 
savage than those produced in premarket economy where differences are 
leveled by regulation.  Echoing Rousseau’s theory of sexuality as the 
root of social division and inequality, Tolstoy’s Pozdnyshev holds that it 
is sexual competition which gives rise to “the domination of women”41 
and the manifold “crimes against women”42 which characterize society. 
On the surface, it may look otherwise.  It is men, after all, who are 
emotionally in thrall to the women—that is what the proverbial story of 
the man consumed by his jealousy is all about.  But, as Pozdnyshev 
explains in a tour de force that would do Hegel proud, the sexual power 
that women wield over men is nothing but the power that every slave 
holds over its master: “‘Just like the Jews: as they pay us back for their 
oppression by a financial domination, so it is with women.’” 
“Ah, you want us to be traders only—all right, as traders we will dominate 
you!” say the Jews.  “Ah, you want us to be merely objects of sensuality—all 
right, as objects of sensuality we will enslave you,” say the women.  Woman’s 
lack of rights arises not from the fact that she must not vote or be a judge—to be 
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id. at 173.  Tolstoy’s analysis here is reminiscent of Catherine MacKinnon’s
critique of the right to choice established in Roe v. Wade.  See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, 
Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 93–102 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987). 
41. Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 174.
42. Id. at 168.
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occupied with affairs is no privilege—but from the fact that she is not man’s 
equal in sexual intercourse and has not the right to use a man or abstain from 
him as she likes—is not allowed to choose a man at her pleasure instead of 
being chosen by him.  You say that is monstrous.  Very well!  Then a man must 
not have those rights either.  As it is at present, a woman is deprived of that 
right while a man has it.  And to make up for that right she acts on man’s 
sensuality, and through his sensuality subdues him so that he only chooses 
formally, while in reality it is she who chooses.  And once she has obtained 
these means she abuses them and acquires a terrible power over people.43
Turning weakness to advantage by trading sex for power.  It is the oldest 
trick in the book. 
Whether we, like Tolstoy’s lawyer and lady, are deluded in thinking 
that recent reforms in sexual behavior and gender relations represent real 
progress, is an interesting question.  Roth’s novella, which takes place 
more than a century later, provides an ambiguous answer.  Certainly, the 
morés of sexual behavior have changed—particularly for women.  And, 
at least on the surface, this would appear to be a move in the direction of 
sexual equality.  Roth says as much: 
That was the transformation Janie wrote about in her thesis.  That was the story 
she told.  The Suburbs.  The Pill.  The Pill that gave parity to woman.  The 
Music. . . . The Car. . . . The Prosperity.  The Commute.  The Divorce.  A lot of 
adult distraction.  The Grass.  Dope.  Dr. Spock.44
“Janie” is one of the “the Gutter Girls,”45 Roth’s inspired creation, a 
group of campus firebrands in the 1960s championing “the cause of 
sexual license.”46  The “Gutter Girls” and “their adherents may well 
have been, historically, the first wave of American girls fully implicated 
in their own desire.”47  As Kepesh, Roth’s pontificating professor, 
explains, “there were two strains to the turbulence” in the sixties: 
There was the libertarianism extending orgiastic permission to the individual 
and opposed to the traditional interests of the community, but with it, often 
wedded to it, there was communal righteousness about civil rights and against 
the war, the disobedience whose moral prestige devolves through Thoreau.48
The sexual revolution ushered in by the likes of the “Gutter Girls” 
represented the first strain.  They “had no objection to the social or the 
political argument, but that was the other side of the decade”—theirs 
“was a pleasure cell, not a political cell.”49  It nonetheless reverberated 
with political values: this was a movement for sexual liberation, and it 
43. Id. at 174.
44. ROTH, supra note 2, at 54–55.
45. Id. at 50.
46. Id. at 52.
47. Id. at 50–51.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 55.
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was also, in Kepesh’s account, a movement for sexual equality, albeit 
one based on quite different notions of equality from the models 
articulated in contemporary feminist theory.  The Rothian notion of 
gender equality, voiced by Kepesh, is one in which women assume the 
sexual prerogatives and sexual license formerly granted exclusively to 
men.  Thus, in his description, the “Gutter Girls” 
of the American sixties knew how to operate around engorged men.  They were 
themselves engorged, so they knew how to transact business with them.  The 
venturous male drive, the male initiative, wasn’t a lawless action requiring 
denunciation and adjudication but a sexual sign that one responds to or not.  To 
control the male impulse and report it?  They were not educated in that 
ideological system.  They were far too playful to be indoctrinated with animus 
and resentment and grievance from above.  They were educated in the 
instinctual system.  They weren’t interested in replacing the old inhibitions and 
prohibitions and moral instruction with new forms of surveillance and new 
systems of control and a new set of orthodox beliefs.  They knew where the 
pleasure was to be had, and they knew how to give over to desire without fear.50
One sees here the digs at contemporary feminism—“that ideological 
system”—that one has come to expect from Roth.  (The Dying Animal, 
the story of an affair between an aging professor and one of his many 
young student-lovers, reads as part apologia, part instruction manual for 
sexual harassers).  But one also sees here, strangely enough, a sort of 
feminist credo.  More specifically, it is a sexual credo in which women 
are imagined as the equals of men (or of Roth’s fantasy of men) in terms 
of “drive,” “initiative,” “pleasure” and “desire.”  It is, in a word, a libertine’s 
credo, much like the one imagined by Tolstroy’s Pozdnyshev. 
As Kepesh puts it, the “Gutter Girls” “democratized the entitlement to 
pleasure.”51  Libertinism for women and libertinism for men—with 
libertinism and justice for all.  The echoes of the “key documents” of 
American liberalism are deliberate here.  The Pledge of Allegiance is the 
only such document that Kepesh does not cite in his unceasing effort to 
construct a philosophical defense for philandering.  (The Pledge, one 
imagines, has become too religious a symbol for Kepesh’s taste since its 
adulteration.)  But time and again, Roth explicitly associates the libertine 
creed that Kepesh embraces with the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 
Like many a Roth character, Kepesh is one who takes a current social 
or political philosophy to absurd logical extremes.  “Me and the sixties? 
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. at 58.
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Well, I took seriously the disorder of those relatively few years, and I 
took the word of the moment, liberation, in its fullest meaning.  That’s 
when I left my wife.”52  He also left his son.  It is Kepesh’s relationship to 
his unforgiving son that forms the real heart of the book, and where his 
invocation of the classic texts of American liberalism becomes most explicit. 
Kepesh’s son sends him denunciatory letters that read like miniature classics 
in the emerging genre of revenge-of-the-children-of-the-sixties novels.53  In 
return, Kepesh lectures his son on the value, as he sees it, of freeing oneself 
from all attachments.  His advice to his son who finds himself following in his 
father’s adulterous footsteps, is classic Kepesh, a peculiar mixture of the 
pedantic and the perverse: 
I reminded [my son] that nobody could make him do what he didn’t want to do.  
I said what I wished some forceful man had said to me when I was on the brink 
of making my mistake.  I said, “Living in a country like ours, whose key 
documents are all about emancipation, all directed at guaranteeing individual 
liberty, living in a free system that is basically indifferent to how you behave as 
long as the behavior is lawful, the misery that comes your way is most likely to 
be self-generated.” . . .  “Here the only tyrant lying in wait will be convention.” 
“If you want to live intelligently beyond the blackmail of the slogans and the 
unexamined rules, you have only to find your own . . .” Et cetera, et cetera.  The 
Declaration of Independence.  The Bill of Rights.  The Gettysburg Address. 
The Emancipation Proclamation.  The Fourteenth Amendment.  All three of the 
Civil War amendments.  I went over everything with him.  I found the 
Tocqueville for him . . . . Conceived in liberty—that’s just good American 
common sense.54
What makes Kepesh so perverse has little to do with his sexual 
practices (they seem fairly ordinary) but lies rather in his insistence that 
his commonplace philandering represents the fulfillment of the liberal 
ideal.  Championing adultery and sexual freedom, he sounds like he is 
channeling Mill.  (Mill himself, of course, held himself scrupulously aloof 
from adultery—and sex—throughout his chaste relationship with Harriet 
Taylor, until her husband died.)  Defending divorce, which he is urging 
on his son, Kepesh invokes no less a figure than John Milton—“the last 
person to take these matters seriously.”55  In the philosophical system 
that Kepesh has constructed for himself, divorce is “a human rights 
issue.  Give me liberty or give me death.”56  Putting himself forward as 
Milton’s spiritual heir, Kepesh offers his own behavior (fleeing 
marriage, fatherhood and emotional commitments of any kind to pursue 
52. Id. at 62.
53. “But what about the children?” is the question that haunts and defines this
genre, well represented by the likes of Michel Houellebecq’s The Elementary Particles 
and Rick Moody’s The Ice Storm.   
54. ROTH, supra note 2, at 81–82.
55. Id. at 68.
56. Id. at 111.
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sexual dalliances) as a philosophical model, as an answer to the timeless 
question, “how does one turn freedom into a system?”57
At least on the surface, Roth’s Kepesh looks to be the polar opposite 
of Tolstoy’s Pozdnyshev.  Whereas Pozdnyshev deplores libertinism as a 
sinister state of dependency which enslaves and debases men and 
women alike, Kepesh offers a philosophical defense of it that rivals that 
of the French philosophical libertines of the eighteenth century in its 
rationalization of unbridled lust.  Like them, Kepesh believes that “lust 
is the sole natural motive of erotic attraction,” and that “sexual pleasure 
is the only goal worthy of being pursued.”58  Like them, he “mistrust[s] 
anything that appear[s] to be immutable” and “believe[s] in a generalized 
inconstancy, inherent both in the nature of things and in the heart of 
man.”59  Like them, he embraces the “freedom of the libertine [which] 
consists in espousing this universal inconstancy,”60 and in scorning both 
love and marriage as “artificial and dangerous aberrations of sensual 
desire.”61  Like them, he aims to “master the discipline of freedom . . . 
and to turn freedom into a system,”62 and to do so by mastering the 
discipline of the “dangerous liaison,” no strings attached.63
Both Kepesh and Pozdnyshev fulminate against marriage but, seemingly, 
for opposite reasons.  Pozdenyshev, as we have seen, views marriage as 
a system of “licensed debauchery,” or licensed libertinism.  Libertinism 
itself—that is, sexual freedom and desire unbridled by commitment—he 
regards as a basic evil, which undermines true liberty, true love, and true 
religious faith.  Kepesh, by contrast, puts marriage, love, and religion all 
on one side in the great battle between Puritanism and freedom.  That, in 
Kepesh’s view, is “[t]he conflict that’s been ongoing from the beginning.”64
Retelling American history through the lens of this conflict, Kepesh 
offers up a revisionist view of a short story by Nathaniel Hawthorne, that 
other great critic of American Puritanism, which features Thomas 
Morton as “the founding father of personal freedom,” “the great theologian 
57. ROTH, supra note 2, at 64.
58. THE LIBERTINE READER, supra note 3, at 10.
59. ROTH, supra note 2, at 12.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 64.
63. See Choderlos de LaClos, Dangerous Liaisons, in THE LIBERTINE READER,
supra note 3, at 911–1254.  
64. ROTH, supra note 2, at 61.
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of no-rules.”65  The story is The Maypole of Merry Mount 66—Merry Mount 
having been an English trading post “that incensed the Puritans” because it 
was “a pagan hotbed”: “men drinking, selling arms to the Indians, 
palling around with the Indians . . . , [c]opulating with Indian women . . . ,” 
and dancing around a maypole.67  As Kepesh explains to his anonymous 
and voiceless interlocutor: 
Hawthorne based a story on that maypole. . . .  Merry Mount was presided over 
for a time by a speculator, a lawyer, a charismatic privileged character named 
Thomas Morton.  He’s kind of a forest creature out of As You Like It, a wild 
demon out of A Midsummer Night’s Dream. . . .  The Plymouth Puritans busted 
him, then the Salem Puritans busted him—put him in stocks, fined him, 
imprisoned him. . . .  He was a source of prurient fascination for the Puritans. 
Because if one’s piety isn’t absolute, it logically leads to a Morton.  The 
Puritans were terrified that their daughters would be carried off and corrupted 
by this  merry miscegenator out at Merry Mount. . . .  Morton was going to turn 
their daughters into the Gutter Girls.68
Kepesh’s view is that “a great fight about the permissible took place 
here,”69 pitting sex and freedom, on one side, against sexual morality 
and religion, on the other: 
The Puritans were the agents of rule and godly virtue and right reason, and on 
the other side it was misrule.  But why is it rule and misrule?  Why isn’t Morton 
the great theologian of no-rules?  Why isn’t Morton seen for what he is, the 
founding father of personal freedom?  In the Puritan theocracy, you were at 
liberty to do good; in Morton’s Merry Mount you were at liberty—that was it.70
As Kepesh sees it, sex is liberty unmodified.  And liberty unmodified is 
“it.”  To indulge in sexual promiscuity, as Thomas Morton supposedly 
did, is thus to be the true champion of liberty.  Likewise, the various 
radical movements for sexual freedom and free love that have emerged 
from time to time are in Kepesh’s eyes the truest expression of the 
liberal political tradition—an irrepressible tradition, in Kepesh’s reading, 
forever being suppressed by the sexual moralists but forever reasserting 
itself in both the literature and the behavior of America’s sexual 
renegades.  Thus, in Kepesh’s idiosyncratic canon of great liberal texts, 
“the voice of Thomas Morton turns up in America again, unexpurgated, 
as Henry Miller.”71
Understanding full well that, to his son, all this is nothing but a set of 
self-serving rationalizations, (“I know all the objections that a pure and 
65. Id. at 61.
66. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Maypole of Merry Mount, in HAWTHORNE’S SHORT
STORIES 23 (Newton Arvin ed., 1955). 
67. ROTH, supra note 2, at 58.
68. Id. at 58–59.
69. Id. at 36.
70. Id. at 61.
71. Id. at 61.
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moral young man can give to claiming personal sovereignty.  I know all 
the admirable labels to attach to not asserting one’s sovereignty”),72 
Kepesh nonetheless expatiates on his philosophy of personal freedom, 
turning the sexual revolution of the sixties and seventies and his own 
philandering into nothing less than a full-blown philosophical system. 
He says explicitly that his aim was to “turn freedom into a system.”73  To 
that end, he “was determined . . . to follow the logic of [the sexual] revolution 
to its conclusion, and without having to become its casualty.”74  Instead, 
his son and his marriage would be the casualties.  Marriage and 
fatherhood had to be abandoned, rejected, and systematically opposed 
for the sake of preserving personal freedom. 
Hence the disappointment Kepesh expresses in the movement for gay 
marriage: “I expected more from those guys, but it turns out there’s no 
realism in them either.”75  Realism, for Kepesh as for the eighteenth-century 
libertine, implies a thoroughgoing cynicism about love and marriage. 
Kepesh opposes gay marriage not because it undermines the “institution 
of marriage” but precisely because it preserves it.  Instead of gays 
assimilating to the dominant heterosexual culture of legally-sanctioned 
monogamy, Kepesh would rather that heterosexuals had patterned 
themselves on the promiscuous gay culture of the post-Stonewall, 
pre-AIDS seventies.  In his analysis, “[t]he nature of ordinary marriage 
is no less suffocating to the virile heterosexual—given the sexual 
preferences of a virile heterosexual—than it is to the gay or the 
lesbian.”76  Hence his lamentation: “now even gays want to get married. . . . 
[T]hey want marriage and they want to openly to join the army and be
accepted.  The two institutions I loathed.  And for the same reason:
regimentation.”77
The great aim, then, is to resist regimentation.  “Give me liberty or give 
me death.”78  In this formulation, sex and divorce are freedom, marriage 
and attachment are death.  These are the classic libertine’s equations.79  
72. Id. at 83.
73. Id. at 64.
74. Id. at 63.
75. Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id. at 68.
78. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
79. The understanding of sex as the antidote to death that Roth attributes to
Kepesh is explicit (in every sense): Sex according to Kepesh is precisely “the revenge on 
death” because unlike (or more so than) any other human pursuit, it “is based in your 
physical being, on the flesh that is born and the flesh that dies.  Because only when you 
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In the libertine’s scheme of things, sex is a good that is equated with the 
good of personal freedom—and vice versa.  Marriage—and love—have 
to be resisted for the sake of preserving one’s personal independence. 
The only cardinal sin in the libertine’s otherwise sinless world is that of 
falling in love—that is, succumbing to the condition of emotional 
dependency on another person.  Following the libertine’s credo, Kepesh 
holds that to love is to relinquish one’s freedom.  And to “[r]elinquish[] 
one’s freedom voluntarily—that is the definition of ridiculousness.”80  
This is why the classic libertine storyline, exemplified by LaClos’s 
Dangerous Liaisons,81 is that of the libertine potentially ensnared by 
love (it is precisely the peril of falling in love that makes the liaison 
dangerous).  Roth’s The Dying Animal falls neatly into this tradition. 
Tolstoy’s Kreutzer Sonata also is a tale of a libertine undone by love. 
But in this version of the story, love and sex—or what passes for love 
and monogamous attachment in conventional society—are equally and 
indistinguishably opposed to true liberty.  And so things will remain so 
long as love remains rooted in sexual attraction.  Marriage is to be 
renounced then, not for the sake of mastering the libertine’s art of sexual 
freedom and avoiding the “ridiculousness” of emotional dependency, but 
rather, for the sake of a much purer and more virtuous ideal, an 
antilibertine ideal of love and liberty which depends on rising above the 
baser animal appetites and rests, ultimately, in Tolstoy’s view, on the 
love of God. 
In this first reading presented, neither Tolstoy’s Pozdnyshev nor 
Roth’s Kepesh looks like an exponent of liberalism, properly understood. 
This is perhaps the most obvious in the case of Tolstoy.  The religious 
philosophy of love that he is espousing is readily dismissed as a 
“conservative” philosophy, based on repressive views of sex and antiquated 
views of women and men.  Inasmuch as it demands subordinating “base” 
appetites to something higher—agapeic love—it appears to be based on 
an outmoded view of psychology and the emotions.  And inasmuch as it 
conceives of freedom as depending on submission to God, it appears to 
be based on just the sort of “puritanical” repressive religious morality 
that Roth’s Kepesh so fiercely opposes. 
But Roth’s antipuritanical Kepesh is no liberal either, by conventional 
fuck is everything that you dislike in life and everything by which you are defeated in 
life purely, if momentarily, revenged.  Only then are you most cleanly alive and most 
cleanly yourself.  It’s not the sex that’s the corruption—it’s the rest.  Sex isn’t just 
friction and shallow fun.  Sex is also the revenge on death.  Don’t forget death.  Don’t 
ever forget it.  Yes, sex too is limited in its power.  I know very well how limited.  But 
tell me, what power is greater?” ROTH, supra note 2, at 69. 
80. ROTH, supra note 2, at 104.
81. Choderlos de LaClos, Dangerous Liaisons, in THE LIBERTINE READER, supra
note 3, at 911–1254. 
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liberal reasoning.  Notwithstanding his repeated invocations of America’s 
canonical liberal texts, it is not difficult to imagine how a liberal philosopher 
would refute him (if Kepesh would ever permit himself to be on the 
receiving end of a lecture).  Kepesh’s is a philosophy of “no-rules,”82 
explicitly intended to resist “what Hawthorne called ‘the limit-loving class.’”83  
It expresses a notion of liberty that knows no bounds.  But liberalism, one 
imagines the liberal philosopher lecturing Kepesh, is not, after all, a 
philosophy of “no-rules.”  Nor does it rest on a notion of a liberty without 
limits.  On the contrary, the liberal intellectual project, from Milton and 
Locke to Mill and Rawls, has always been precisely to identify the “proper 
limits” of the scope of personal freedom.  A belief in the existence of such 
limits is what has traditionally differentiated the normative liberal project 
from anarchism, libertinism, and more radical forms of libertarianism, just 
as a belief in the importance of protecting personal liberty (within those 
limits) is what has traditionally differentiated normative liberalism from 
inappropriately repressive systems of regulation or “Puritanism.”  To reject 
all limits as inconsistent with the liberal project of preserving personal 
independence, one imagines the liberal philosopher saying, is just to make a 
conceptual mistake.  It is to mistake liberty for license, as early exponents of 
liberalism like Milton were wont to say.  Or, in a more modern idiom, it is 
to mistake a conception of liberty bounded by respect for the equal liberty of 
all for a delusional philosophy of individual omnipotence and unlimited 
power. 
This basic difference between Kepesh’s philosophy of “no-rules” and 
normative liberalism can be discerned in the statements he makes about 
sexual equality and power.  Kepesh is no liberal here: 
There is no sexual equality and there can be no sexual equality, certainly not 
one where the allotments are equal, the male quotient and the female quotient in 
perfect balance.  There’s no way to negotiate metrically this wild thing.  It’s not 
fifty-fifty like a business transaction.  It’s the chaos of eros we’re talking about, 
the radical destabilization that is its excitement.  You’re back in the woods with 
sex.  You’re back in the bog.  What it is is trading dominance, perpetual 
imbalance.  You’re going to rule out dominance?  You’re going to rule out 
yielding?  The dominating is the flint, it strikes the spark, it sets it going.  Then 
what?  Listen.  You’ll see what dominating leads to.  You’ll see what yielding 
leads to.”84
In content, this passage could be straight out of the annals of the 
82. ROTH, supra note 2, at 61.
83. Id. at 51.
84. Id. at 20.
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libertinism.  (Think of de Sade, and the mockery he makes—back in the 
woods—of liberal notions of equal rights.)  But in style, the passage 
bears an uncanny resemblance to Tolstoy (“‘would you like me to tell 
you how that love led to what happened to me?’”)85  In Tolstoy’s case, 
the story of “what yielding leads to” is the story of how sexual relations 
inevitably led to sexual dependency and domination, possessiveness, 
jealousy, and death (murder).  In Roth the sequence is much the same. 
(Cancer takes the place of murder in The Dying Animal, but the torment of 
sexual jealousy borne of dependency, dependency borne of love, and love 
borne of sexual attraction remain—as does the spectre of death).  Which 
raises the question, whether these seemingly opposite stories—the tale of 
the libertine and the tale of the antilibertine—are not actually in some 
fundamental respect the same. 
II. SECOND READ: LIBERTINISM, LIBERALISM, AND MARRIAGE.
In this second (shorter!) reading, the boundary line between libertinism 
and antilibertinism collapses, and, with it, the boundary line between 
libertinism and liberalism.  What is left in the place of three neatly 
delineated philosophies is a fundamental ambivalence concerning the 
appropriateness of placing limits on the expression of sexual desire, as 
well as a profound uncertainty about the relationship of sexual desire 
to love.  Ultimately, the question that liberalism must struggle with is the 
relationship of liberty to both love and desire.  What the contemporary 
debates about marriage reveal is just how undertheorized that 
relationship is.  It is perhaps not surprising that it is our great fiction 
writers who have come closest to theorizing, or at least 
problematizing, the relationship between liberty and love, as seen in 
the libertine/antilibertine novella. 
The boundary line between libertinism and antilibertinism has always 
been fuzzy.  The standard storyline of the libertine roman, made familiar 
to many by Dangerous Liaisons,86 is that of the libertine who violates 
his own principles by succumbing to sexual possessiveness, jealousy, 
dependency—in a word, love.  Roth replicates this storyline exactly: 
“No matter how much you know,” Kepesh admits to his unnamed 
confidante, “no matter how much you plot and you connive and you 
plan, you’re not superior to sex.  It’s a very risky game.”87
The risk, of course, the danger that makes dangerous liaisons 
dangerous, is that sex will lead to attachment.  The libertine contract is 
85. Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 163.
86. DANGEROUS LIAISONS (Warner Bros. 1988).
87. ROTH, supra note 2, at 12, 33.
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for sex without strings.  But “jealousy is the trap door to the contract.” 
The conventional solution to the problem of male jealousy, as Kepesh 
understands, is marriage: 
Men respond to jealousy by saying, “Nobody else is going to have her.  I’m going to 
have her—I’ll marry her.  I’ll capture her that way.  By convention.”  Marriage cures 
the jealousy.  That’s why many men seek it out.  Because they’re not sure of that 
other person, they get her to sign the contract: I will not, et cetera.88
But like any self-respecting libertine, Kepesh has renounced this 
traditional solution to the problem of jealousy.  The libertine’s preferred 
solution is supposed to be the cultivation of indifference to one’s 
partner’s promiscuity.  Striving to make of promiscuity a virtue, the 
libertine is supposed to be a professional who avoids emotional 
attachment and possessiveness altogether.  But that of course is just the 
theory.  In practice, the libertine plays at lovemaking, and there is 
always the risk that he will fail to maintain his emotional indifference, 
and be foiled at his own game. 
That Kepesh’s jealousy emerges at the just the moment when his lover 
tells him that she could never marry him is telling in this regard.  “‘It 
was in that moment . . . while she explained that she could not be my 
wife, that my terrible jealousy was born.’”89  And terrible it is, rivaling 
that of Pozdnyshev in its self-punishing intensity if not in its 
murderous consequences: “‘[F]rom the evening we first went to bed 
eight years back, I never had a moment’s peace . . . the fear of losing her 
to someone else never left me.’”90  Just as Tolstoy’s Pozdnyshev 
drives himself to murderous distraction by imagining, and practically 
hallucinating, his wife in the arms of the young musician who may 
or may not actually be her lover, so Kepesh is driven crazy by the 
“pornography of jealousy.  The pornography of one’s own destruction,” 
that is, mentally picturing his lover having sex with another man.  It is 
precisely this picturing that shatters the libertine’s sublime indifference 
because “picturing it, it is impossible to think in what you rationally 
construe as your own self-interest.”91
But picturing is hard to avoid once one has entered into a sensual 
relationship.  This is, in Kepesh’s blunt analysis, “the eternal problem of 
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 26.
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id. at 42.
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attachment.”92  “Attachment is ruinous and your enemy.  Joseph Conrad: 
He who forms a tie is lost.”93  As Kepesh laments, “Jealousy creeps in. 
Attachment creeps in.  The eternal problem of attachment.  No, not even 
fucking can stay totally pure and protected.”94  And, in a still more anguished 
formulation: “These crazy distortions of longing, doting, possessiveness, 
even of love.  This need.  This derangement.  Will it never stop?”95  It is 
the technical definition of ridiculousness: the “voluntary” relinquishment 
of freedom.  Kepesh is in love. 
In adhering strictly to the standard storyline of the libertine novel, 
Roth replicates the ambiguities that have always attended the genre.  As 
scholars of libertinism have pointed out, it is in point of fact extremely 
difficult to distinguish the genre of libertine literature from antilibertine 
literature since both typically end with the libertine failing at his game. 
Is the moral of the story of the lapsed libertine the antilibertine message 
that libertinism is a trap to be escaped, that true liberty comes with true 
love, and that love conquers all?  Or is it rather the ironic and cautionary 
message the more cynical libertine would urge us to draw?  (Watch out, 
reader, or this could happen to you.)  It is impossible to say because of 
the ambiguities that are deliberately built into the structure of the story. 
There are in fact two layers of ambiguity.  First, it is ambiguous 
whether the standard ending (the libertine in love) is to be understood as 
a happy ending, or a sad or ironic one.  If we take it as a happy ending, 
then the libertine’s story becomes indistinguishable from the antilibertine’s. 
The lapsed libertine, after all, repudiates libertinism—at least in practice, 
if not also in theory—just as the antilibertine does.  (Neither Kepesh nor 
Pozdnyshev is, by the end, a practicing libertine, though both may be 
forever recovering ones.)  As for the lapsed libertine’s theoretical 
commitments, there is a further ambiguity.  If we do take the ending as a 
happy one, as many readers are wont to do, it is open to interpretation 
whether it represents the sacrifice of liberty for something else, 
something “higher”—love or God, or both, as the case may be—or 
alternatively, whether it represents the replacement of a warped 
conception of liberty for a truer one. 
Which of these, in other words, is “liberty worth the name”?96  That is 
the question posed by the ambiguous ending of the libertine/antilibertine 
novel.  Is it the freedom that the professing libertine prizes, which gives 
the instincts and drives free reign?  Or is it the freedom of normative 
92. Id. at 105.
93. Id. at 100.
94. Id. at 105.
95. Id. at 106.
96. The phrase is drawn from Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency,
Giden Yaffe’s excellent study of Locke’s view of free agency. 
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liberalism, which depends on the idea of a properly ordered psyche, in 
which the instincts and drives are sublimated in the “higher faculties” 
which alone enables people to become truly free?  The tale of the lapsed 
libertine is open to either interpretation. 
Traditionally, liberalism explicitly depended upon just the sort of 
moral psychology described above.  Alongside religious theology, a 
theory of moral psychology that subordinated the appetites to virtue and 
reason supplied the theoretical foundations of the earliest formulations 
of liberal political philosophy, which allowed and indeed compelled 
liberalism to distinguish itself from libertinism.  “Liberty, not license” is 
a refrain one finds in most of the early liberal theorists, including 
Kepesh’s beloved Milton,97 who, as a deeply committed Protestant 
subscribed to much the same view of human psychology, love, and 
liberty as did Tolstoy, with his Russian Orthodoxy.  For both Milton and 
Tolstoy, true liberty was “Christian liberty.”98  Christian liberty entailed 
freedom of choice and liberty of conscience, which in turn entailed the 
freedom to disbelieve or disobey God; but it also entailed choosing 
wisely, virtuously, and rightly—choosing to submit to or love God. 
Otherwise, it was not liberty worth the name.99 
As articulated by its early exponents, like Milton and Locke, 
liberalism rested both on a religious theology and on a moral 
psychology—the two were mutually reinforcing—diametrically opposed 
to Kepesh’s “theology of no-rules.”  What, then, becomes of liberalism 
when it frees itself from its original foundations in Christian theology? 
It is tempting to conclude that modern liberalism freed itself from the 
psychology of virtue when it freed itself from its original theological 
foundations.  But if so, what if any moral psychology is liberalism 
97. See Milton, supra note 6, at 698.
98. On the concept of Christian liberty, see Michael W. McConnell, New
Liberalism, Old Liberalism, and People of Faith, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
99. The affinity suggested here between Tolstoy’s views and those of classical
liberals may help to explain what otherwise remains a puzzle: why Tolstoy’s Kreutzer 
Sonata, which could easily be read as resting on the most conservative views of sex and 
of gender roles, was enthusiastically embraced by most left-leaning readers of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Notwithstanding the fact that Tolstoy’s novella 
hardly endorsed “free love,” as the anarchists practiced it, and the further fact that 
Tolstoy plainly based his ideas on Christian faith, while the anarchists purported to reject 
all forms of religion as the opiate of the masses, The Kreutzer Sonata was widely 
reprinted in anarchist journals, and embraced by both anarchists and more moderate 
liberal exponents of early feminism and marriage reform. 




committed to now?  More specifically, what view does liberalism take, 
and what view should it take, of the appropriateness of subjecting sexual 
desire, and subjective preferences or “appetites,” more generally, to 
normative limits? 
In fact, modern liberalism appears to be internally conflicted on the 
subject.  Worse still, this appears to be a subject to which liberal 
theorists, outside the realm of fiction, have given relatively little thought.  
There has been a spate of recent philosophical writing on the subject of 
love and the emotions, more generally, which is to be welcomed.100  But 
the appearance of this body of work attests more to the ongoing need for 
a theory of love and emotional attachments than to the actual provision 
of one that can adequately answer the question posed above. 
The basic conflict evident in these works is the same conflict evident 
in Roth and Tolstoy.  Modern liberalism would seem to be opposed to 
the supposedly outmoded religious ideas about sex and virtue, the 
emotions and reason that underlay early liberal thought.  This might 
suggest that modern liberalism supports the sort of antipuritanical 
libertinism that Kepesh preaches (but fails to practice).  However, 
liberalism is not so cleanly separated from antilibertine ideas of the sort 
expressed by Tolstoy, about the necessity of subordinating the realm of 
the appetites to something higher.  Nor, on the other hand, is it so easily 
separated from libertine ideas which insist on freedom from all limits, 
including the self-imposed limits of emotional commitment and love.  
Indeed, liberalism might best be viewed as embodying the predicament 
of perpetually trying to navigate between the shoals of no-rules, no-
limits libertinism, on the one hand, and repressive “Puritanism” on the 
other—without ever succeeding in circumventing either one. 
The ambivalence of this position can be seen in the ambivalence 
liberalism expresses in the contemporary debate about marriage.  On the 
one hand, liberalism might well be taken to support the view put forth by 
Roth’s Kepesh about marriage in general, and gay marriage in particular.  
There is an impeccable logic to the view that marriage is a system of 
 100. See, e.g., HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE REASONS OF LOVE (2004); JONATHAN 
LEAR, LOVE AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE (1994).  There is of course a centuries-old 
tradition of philosophical discussions of love (see the writings collected in the useful 
anthology, THE PHILOSOPHY OF (EROTIC) LOVE (Robert C. Solomon & Kathleen M. 
Higgins eds., 1991)), and I do not mean to imply that there is no philosophical writing on 
the subject.  However, the question of how to reconcile the various conditions of 
emotional dependency, attachment, and commitment associated with love with the 
liberal ideal of personal freedom is a subject that remains in need of further 
investigation, though it is a central theme of many literary works.  In the domain of 
psychological theorizing, contemporary writers engaged at least tangentially with the 
subject include Adam Phillips and Stephen Mitchell.  See, e.g., ADAM PHILLIPS, ON 
FLIRTATION (1994); ADAM PHILLIPS, MONOGAMY (1996); STEPHEN MITCHELL, CAN LOVE 
LAST? (2002). 
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state-sponsored regulation that impinges on personal liberty that ought to 
be opposed on liberal grounds.  On the other hand, the case against 
marriage, exemplified by Kepesh and that minority of gay rights 
advocates who (in keeping with the gay libertine tradition) continue to 
argue against marriage, seems to depend on a conception of liberty that 
admits no limits. 
In viewing every lasting emotional attachment as a species of sinister 
control, this is a conception of liberty that threatens to leave its adherents 
loveless, radically alone and truly unfree, slaves to their own fear of 
attachment and addiction to sex.  This is a vision of liberty that many 
liberals recoil from.  But in order to square this rejection of the 
libertine’s version of freedom with the liberal ideal of freedom, 
liberalism requires a theory of limits that can explain when and why the 
condition of emotional dependency that attachments entail is consistent 
with the value of freedom.  It requires a theory of psychology that can 
explain why it is appropriate to subject sexual desire to limits, that can 
explain what kinds of limits are acceptable, and what kinds of social 
institutions they should be embodied in.  In short, liberalism requires a 
theory of love. 
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